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odern science, particularly physics, is cur
rently making claims about the existence of
all kinds of fascinating entities. These range
from quarks, superstrings, and gravitinos to
singularities, warped spacetime, and gravitational waves.
While these entities inspire awe and amazement, it is possi
ble that their positing is premature and perhaps entirely
unfounded. In this essay, I will argue that this is indeed the
case. Any ontological claims about the aforementioned enti
ties rest on a form of realism that I believe is unwarranted.
Rather, anti-realism, particularly scientific phenomenalism
is the view that seems to be most reasonable. In this essay, I
will first explain a version of scientific phenomenalism (SP)
defended by W.T. Stace. After addressing some standard
objections, I will propose some advantages that SP holds
over scientific realism, particularly in the realm of physicS.
Scientific phenomenalism belongs to the larger cate
gory of anti-realism. Anti-realism denies the main claims of
realism, namely, that scientific theories have truth values,
theoretical entities really exist, and the aim of science is to
give a literally true account of the world.i SF denies these
claims and holds that science tells us simply how things ap
pear. All that can be known to exist, at least scientifically,
are the sensations of the world that we experience and how
they are ordered. Any claims about the existence of theo
retical entities (like forces, curved spacetime, elech'ons, po
tential energy, and electromagnetic fields) that underlie
these sensations are unfounded.
SP holds that no amount of sense data can justify be
lief in something outside of perception. For no matter how
many observations you have, it is invalid to then logically
infer the existence of something beyond those observations.
Stace argues that all causal relationships that are observed
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are in the world of perception. He writes,
If you admit that we never observe anything except
sensed objects and their relations, regularities, and
sequences, then it is obvious that we are completely
shut in by our sensations and can never get outside
them. Not only causal relations, but all other ob
served relations, upon which any kind of inferences
might be founded, will lead only to further sensible
objects and their relations. No inference, therefore,
can pass from what is sensible to what is not sensi
ble. ii

I believe Stace is right insofar as we are unable to infer the
existence of theoretical entities based on sensible objects
and relations. I do think that some inference from observ
abIes to unobservables is appropriate, just not in the prac
tice of science.
Put another way, science, by its own standards, in
volves the study of the observable world. A theory that is
produced can only mean something scientifically if there is
some observation that can be done to confirm or falsify the
theory. And so, if a scientific claim involves the existence of
an object that by definil:ion cannot be observed, this claim
ceases to be scientific. This is what happens when theoreti
cal entities are posited to exist. They themselves can never
be observed, only their supposed effects. Thus, claims
about the existence of these entities are not in the realm of
science. That is not to say that such claims are meaningless.
Rather, they are metaphysical claims which I believe hap
pen to have significant problems (I will not go into those
problems here). But for scientists to make claims about the
existence of theoretical entities is for scientists to go beyond
the bounds of their discipline. As Chalmers puts it, a moti
vation underlying anti-realism seems to be the desire to re
strict science to those claims that can be justified by scien
tific means, and so avoid unjustifiable speculation."iii It
seems quite inappropriate to posit and defend, in the name
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of science, the existence of entities that can, in principle,
never be measured by the very tools of science, or any other
tools for that matter.
However, this is not at all to say that theoretical enti
ties are worthless and completely untrue. They are untrue
in the sense that they do not correspond to any real, mind
independent existence in the physical world. However,
they can be true in the sense that they are able to predict
certain sensations (both in the future, and past recorded
ones)}v For forces, curved spacetime, electrons, potential
energy, and electromagnetic fields have proved to be very
effective in predicting certain phenomena. Stace writes,
It is a matter of no importance to the scientific man

whether the forces exist or not. That may be said to
be a purely philosophical question. And I think the
philosopher should pronounce them fictions. But
that would not make the law useless or untrue. If it
could still be used to predict phenomena, it would
be just as true as it wasY
While exploring this issue it is important to add.ress
a point more fundamental to the discussion. This is
whether science explains anything, or if it just describes
and predicts phenomena. Stace holds that it does the latter,
and that beliefs in the former are what cause confusions
over theoretical entities. For if one believes that science ex
plains things, then it is quite natural to look for underlying
entities that are "causing" the observed phenomena. I-Iow
ever, what really seems to be going on is the more detailed
description of what is happening. For example, a tElble feels
hard to the touch because of the repulsion of the electron
shells of the atoms involved, which is attributed tol:he elec
tromagnetic force, which is ultimately a m,ani£estation of
the combined electroweak force.
While these
explanations" are couched in explanatory language, it is
clear that they are just further descriptions, at some point,
leaving the realm of perception and entering the realm of
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theoretical entities. Niels Bohr wrote, "It is wrong to think
that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics
concerns only what we can say about nature."vi
For example, when the question about why things
fall was posed, the force of gravity was offered. And when
this proved inadequate, curved spacetime was offered.vii .
However, in reality, these forces and spacetime curves are
simply mathematical tools to predict sensations. As Stace
points out, "And anyone who takes them for 'existences'
gets asked awkward questions as to what 'curved space' is
curved 'in. "'viii
I will now address some standard objections to SP.
First, it is argued that scientific theories (like quantum me
chanics) have been so amazingly successful in making pre
dictions, how could they at least not in some way be true?
SP acknowledges that theories can be very successful in
predicting phenomena; that is why theoretical entities are
not worthless. However, just because a theory makes suc
cessful predictions, it does 1I.ot follow that it must be true or
nearly true. On the contrary, the ability of a theory to make
predictions with related theoretical entities not actually ex
isting has allowed. the continuation of some past theories
(an example is Fresnel's theory of light as waves in an elas
tic ether)ix. Furthermore, because of the metaphysical na
ture of claims about theoretical entities, it is not necessary
for the entities to exist for a prediction to be correct. In fact,
theoretical entities by definition could never be observed,
only their supposed effects.
Another objection involves the supposed vindication
of atomic theory in the early twentieth century. Near the
end of the nineteenth century, several anti-realists
(including Duhem, Mach, and Ostwald) would not accept
the atomic theory as true. The supposed atOIns were not
real, but rather "useful fictions." However, by 1910, the
supposed vindication of this theory was thought to have
put anti-realism to rest.x According to Chalmers, the anti
realists have a response:
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They demand that only that part of science that is
subject to confirmation by observation and experi
ment should be treated as candidates for truth or
falsity. However they can acknowledge that as sci
ence progresses, and as more probing instruments
and experimental techniques are devised, the range
of claims that can be subject to experimental confir
mation is extended. xi
l

Another reply is that, to use the objector's own language, it
is still not clear that the atom has ever been observed. An
atom can never be seen. The wavelength of visible light is
not small enough to resolve the distances at the atomic
scale. All that is "seen" are pictorial representations of some
other probing technique. "Experiences" of atoms (or any
other merely theoretical entities) are ultimately sensations
which are quite compatible with scientific phenomenalism.
One may further object that scientific theories imply
the existence of theoretical entities. However, this cannot be
so. As Beebee puts it,
A theory employing theoretical terms is really only
'about' the observable world: what makes the the
ory true is the obseruable facts being the way the the
ory says they are. Theoretical terms are introduced
into a theory only to make it simpler or more ele
gant. Their presence does not indicate any ontologi
cal commitment to unobservable entities 'referred'
to by the terms, since the terms don't, despite initial
appearances, refer to such entities. xii

A good example of this is presented by Stace. He discusses
the nature of potential energy. Classical physics includes
the idea of potential energy in order to support the law of
conservation of energy. In order to preserve conservation of
energy, sometimes when energy seems to disappear, it
really is being transferred into potential energy. "Now /', as
Stace writes, Jlwhat does this blessed world 'potential'
which is thus brought in to save the situation-mean as ap
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plied to energy? .. What positive meanin.g has the term?
Strictly speaking, none whatever. Either the energy exists or
it does not exist. There is no realm of the 'potential' half
way between .existence and non-existence."xiii Rather, the
concept of potential energy is introduced to simplify the
equations. However, it is a subtle and easy step to Inake the
claim that this potential energy actually exists: "There will
always be temptation to hypostatize the potential energy
as an 'existence,' and to believe that it is a 'cause' which
'explains' the phenomena."xiv It is natural for humans to try
to create a mental picture of a physical process. However, it
seems that this inclination is naIve, and cannot be the aim
of scientific theories. Paul Dirac writes, "The main object of
physical science is not the provision of pictures, but is the
formulation of laws governing phenomena and the applica
tion of these laws to the discovery of new phenomena. If a
picture exists, so much the better; but whether a picture ex
ists or not is a matter of only secondary importance."xv
I will now present some of the advantages of adopt
ing SP as opposed to scientific realism. One favorab1e result
of scientific phenomenalism. is that it accounts quite nicely
for the rejection of theoretical entities in the past, but the
retention of their corresponding observations. It is easy to
forget that in the past, light <;:orpuscles and the ether were
believed in strongly, perhaps as strongly as electrons are
believed in now. However, these entities were rejected be
cause their corresponding theories were rejected. The ob
servations, that initially supported and then disproved
their existences, remained. Chalmers writes,

a

Anti-realists can point to the history of science to
substantiate their claim that the theoretical part of
science does not qualify as securely established.
Not only have theories of the past been rejected as
false, but many of the entities postulated by them
are no longer believed to exist. .. However, the anti
realist will insist that, although these theories
proved to be untrue, there is no denying the posi
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tive role they played in helping to order, and in
deed to discover, observable phenomena... In the
light of tlus, it seems plausible to evaluate theories
solely in terms of their ability to order and predict
observable phenomena. xvi

I will now discuss a few cases in which SP presents a.
great advantage in interpreting some rather paradoxical sci
entific findings. Usually, it is inevitable that in the first year
or two of university education, physics students will en
counter the first of many paradoxes within the realm of
modern physics. Here, the nature of everyday light comes
under great scrutiny. Two famous experiments suggest two
totally opposite natures of light. First, the photoelectric ef
fect revealed that light seemed to come in tiny bundles, or
quanta. These quanta were called photons and appeared to
behave like particles. However, the two-slit diffraction ex
periment revealed that light had a very wave-like nature.
For when light was shone through a slide with two narrow
slits close to each other, the effect on the screen behind was
that of interference. This could only result from the con
structive and destructive interference between waves of
light. However, if individual photons were fired at this
slide at half hour intervals, the same interference pattern
would gradually emerge on the screen (one dot at a time).
Somehow, it seems that each individual photon would con
spire with all the rest (temporally separated) to interfere
with one another and make the corresponding interference
pattern. xvii But that is a nonsensical interpretation. Even
though each photon acts like a particle, it has a distinct
wave nature. But it itself is not purely a wave or else it
would interfere with itself. Thus, light seemed to have both
wave-like and particle-like properties, depending on which
nature was being investigated. The problem w'as compli
cated further when this effect was observed using electrons.
Not only radiation, but matter, appeared to have a dual na
ture. This, however, presents a Significant problem. How
could an electron be both a particle and also a wave spread

DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENALISM

out over vast amounts of space?xviii Both could not be tl'ue
at the same time. And so a serious paradox arises. How
ever, the young physicist encountering this problem for the
first time simply accepts this paradox and moves on to her
next class assignment. Later, she will probably take a
course or two in quantum mechanics and leal'll. about the
existence of probability waves (or wave functions) which
represent the electron and predict the results of the two-slit
diffraction experiment. However, this just substitutes one
hard to understand concept for an even more difficult one.
For how could a probability wave ever exist? What is its
fundamental nature? Is it just a mere mathematical con
struct? Bruce Gregory writes "The wave function
[probability wave] that forms the solution to Schroedinger's
equation does not picture something in nature."xix
And so, the ontological statuses of light, electrons,
and probability waves become very troublesome, and can
exist as a "thorn in one's mind."xx However, I suggest that
the mental quandary that can occur when b'ying to grasp
these entities is entirely unnecessary. Its elimination not
only provides some mental relief, but a deeper understand
ing of reality. According to scientific phenomenalism, these
troublesome entities are only troublesome because they are
complex mathematical entities that are h'Jing to be
squeezed into an existential box. They do not exist in the
physical world; they are simply mathematical consb'ucts
used to describe and predict phenomena that do actually
exist. Once this is realized, the tension is relieved because
we no longer have to reconcile there actually existing an
object that has apparently contradictory properties. Rather,
we simply acknowledge what does exist and thus what
should be used in scientific reasoning: the observed phe
nomena and their mathematical description. Bruce Greg
ory, on Warner Heisenberg's take on this issue, writes:
The problem with trying to understand the behav
ior of electrons arises, Heisenberg said, because we
persist in thinking of electrons as tiny marbles; we
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persist in talking as if there were subatonu,c
objects" that physical theories somehow describe.
But elech'ons are not objects in this sense at all, ..
Asking what the behavior of electrons is really"
like arises out of the marble fallacy. Such question
ing is futile. At best any answer is simply a matter
of taste. Discussions that do not lead to any new
predictions have no impact on science; discussions
that lead to new predictions are challenges to be
met by experiments in the laboratory.xxi
H

II

Another example might serve to illuminate this
point further. In the field of particle physics, there exists the
Standard Model (SM), a theory that has proved spectacular
in making accurate predictions. However, there was a pos
sible problem with the SM, one that at first glance could ap
pear fatal. In order for the theory to work, all particles must
be massless. This is obviously not the case, but a clever trick
has been developed to circumvent this problem. This trick
is the Higgs mechanism. The Higgs mechanism involves a
field which gives mass to all the particles (that have rnass)
and as a result produces another particle, the I-:Tiggs boson.
(Incidentally, this boson has not been" discovered" yet and
is crucial to the survival of the SM.) This Higgs field. is in
teresting because it supposedly couples to all massive parti
cles. I have heard several analogies to try to explain how
this happens. One explanation is that somehow, wherever a
massive particle is present, it is present with the Higgs field
which gives it its mass. Another more crude analogy refers
to particles, when they move through space, as lTIoving
through a sort of molasses which is the Higgs field. The
more they are slowed down by the molasses, the lTIOre mass
they obtain. While these analogies have SOl1le intuitive ap
peal, they are really attempting to solve an unnecessary
problem, namely, the problem of u.nderstanding what this
Higgs field really is and how it behaves in the physical
world. It seems to be more accurate to say that we observe
that particles have mass, and the mathematical expression
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of this mass is the Higgs mechanism. But we do not have to
say that the Higgs field really exists.
One last example from physics. According to Max
well's equations, electromagnetic (EM) interactions occur
via electromagnetic waves. These waves were initially
thought to propagate through an ether. However, this ether
was found not to exist but the EM waves were still meas
ured. xxii So, the natural question arises: What do these EM
waves trav.el in? What do the waves wave in? The answer is
nothing. It gets even more conceptually difficult when try
ing to understand how an EM wave moves. One way to
think about it would be that at any given location, the elec
tric (E)-field and magnetic (B)-field oscillate up and down
at perpendicular directions as the EM wave passes through.
But this only passes the problem off to E-fields and B-fields.
What are they? WelL they can be measured by placing a
test charge in the region and seeing how it moves. Now we
are in the realm of observation. But until we move into this
realm, the concepts of EM waves, E-fielcls, and B-fields are
extremely difficult to grasp. Richard Feynman echoes this
frustration: "I have no picture of the electromagnetic field
that is in any sense accurate .. .It requires a much higher de
gree of imagination to understand the electromagnetic field
than to understand invisible angels ... "xxiii Perhaps these
fields are just useful mathematical tools that help to predict
where a test charge will move, or whether you will hear
grunge rock or NPR coming from your radio.
Not only does scientific phenomenalism provide a
more concise and mentally peaceful understanding of the
physical world, it also can provide a better context for the
ory development. One of the supposed. advantages of Pop
perian falsification ism is that it encourages the develop
ment of bold, risky hypotheses that are easy to falsify. By
the invention of bold theories, science can move along be
cause as each new theory is falsified, something new is
learned which can be incorporated into the next theory.xxiv
Thus, it is argued that falsificationism provides a cleaner,
quicker, and more accurate development of science.
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Whether or not this is the case, I believe that scientific phe
nomenalism can provide this same benefit. On the other
hand, I believe that scientific realism can bog down scien
tific processes with unnecessary metaphysical problems.
The following is, I think, a good example. In particle phys
there is a several decade old theory called supersym
metry (SUSY). According to this theory, every particle cur
rently known to exist" has a supersymmetric partner,
which is usually much more massive. SUSY is theoretically
attractive because it avoids the undesirable problem of
large canceling infinities in the Standard Model. However,
one alleged drawback to this theory is that in one simple
act, the number of elementary particles currently thought to
exist doubles. Some physicists find this troublesome, not
only because it provides many more particles that have to
be looked for and found, but because, to begin with, there
were already too many elementary particles in the SM.
However, this kind of theory, whether or not it is success
ful, is exactly the kind of theory that needs to be presented
and rigorously explored just because of the fact that it is
bold, The belief in scientific realism can produ.ce a kind of
reluctance to seriously explore more unconventional theo
ries. This is because, according to this view, these more ex
travagant theories may contain many more theoretical enti
ties tllat must be discovered and incorporated into an al
ready burgeoning metaphysical schema, However, the sci
entific phenomenalist can welcome these theories as bold
ways to advance the course of science. There is no need to
try to make metaphysical sense of the new mathematical
entities.
In the end, it seems that the more philosophically
appropriate and practically useful philosophy of science is
scientific phenomenalism. Not only does it check meta
physical claims that are cloaked in scientific terms, but it
provides a more natural way of understanding some sup
posed paradoxes in physics. Some may say that SP elimi
nates the awe and wonder that have been inspired by these
alleged theoretical entities. However, the awe and wonder
/I
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remain; perhaps they have just been misdirected.
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